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The assignment of the Supreme Court’s majority opinions is one of the principal prerogatives enjoyed by the Chief Justice. A strategic Chief Justice is able to influence the course of legal policy through agenda setting; that is, the Chief Justice
exercises influence over policy by choosing the Justice who will author an opinion,
thereby determining which policy alternative will be developed in a majority opinion draft. Through strategic opinion assignment, then, the Chief is able to guide
the Court to an outcome that is closest to his preference or that will result in the
least policy loss. Despite the importance of this prerogative for agenda setting and
the development of the law, the Chief Justice operates within twin constraints: the
need for majority support for the proposed opinion and the efficient operation of
the Court. In particular, the Chief Justice often assigns opinions to Justices with
whom he allies in order to maintain fragile conference majorities. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist also asserted that his assignments were based on the need to
complete work on the cases and to maintain an equitable distribution of cases
among the Justices. Using data drawn from the papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun and other sources, I test these expectations through an examination of opinion assignment during the Rehnquist Court from October Term 1986 through October Term 1993.

INTRODUCTION
Many scholars have characterized the Chief Justice as first among
1
equals. The absence of additional powers of influence led former
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, before his ascension to the center
seat, to describe the Chief Justice as presiding “over a conference not
of eight subordinates, whom he may direct or instruct, but of eight as-
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1
See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 82 (1964) (“[T]he
Chief Justice, while usually thought of by his colleagues only as primus inter pares, does
have some authority which other members of the Court do not possess.”); Sue Davis,
Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Opinion Assignments, 74 JUDICATURE 66, 67
(1990) (“The Chief Justice is often described as primus inter pares, ‘first among
equals.’”).
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sociates who, like him, have tenure during good behavior, and who
2
are as independent as hogs on ice.” Nevertheless, the Chief Justice
enjoys a powerful prerogative in the assignment of majority opinions.
The power to assign authorship of the Court’s opinion provides the
Chief with the capacity to direct the Court’s policy-making agenda.
This assignment power is unique among the Chief’s duties in its ability to shape the development of the law.
The Justices themselves recognize the potency of the Chief’s assignment power. In the well-known exchange between Justice William
O. Douglas and Chief Justice Warren E. Burger leading up to Roe v.
3
Wade, Douglas criticized the assignment of the opinion to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun. When the Court chose to hold Roe for reargument in the 1972 Term, Douglas drafted a dissent that lay bare what
he saw as the manipulation of the Court through opinion assignment.
He suggested that the Chief Justice’s goal in assigning the opinion to
Blackmun was “to keep control of the merits,” lamenting that this
strategy “makes the decisions here depend on the manipulative skills
4
of a Chief Justice.” Regardless of one’s view of Chief Justice Burger’s
assignment in Roe, Douglas’s claims certainly merit attention, as the
Chief Justice may seek to influence the Court’s agenda and the course
of legal development through the exercise of his opinion assignment
powers.
There are other effects, beyond agenda setting, that opinion assignment can have on the Court. Most notably, the choices that the
Chief Justice makes in carrying out this duty affect the operation of
the Court. The Justices make clear that they have expectations for
how the Chief will discharge this duty. Specifically, they expect to obtain their “fair share” of assignments. Failure of a Chief Justice to equitably distribute assignments across Justices will inevitably lead to tension on the Court. Douglas’s complaints about Chief Justice Burger
culminated in his cry that Burger’s assignment tactics in Lloyd Corp. v.
5
Tanner led “to a frayed and bitter Court full of needless strains and

2

William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637,
637 (1976).
3
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4
Memorandum from Justice William O. Douglas to Justice William J. Brennan
(June 2, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter
Douglas memorandum]. Douglas, of course, ultimately withdrew this dissent and simply noted his dissent to the decision to hold Roe for reargument. Roe v. Wade, 408
U.S. 919, 919 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5
407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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6

quarrels.” Equity, though critical, is not the lone expectation held by
the Justices. Other norms can affect the functioning of the Court—
assigning opinions, for instance, to Justices who efficiently dispatch
their writing chores. As I will discuss shortly, former Chief Justice
Rehnquist gave these factors, dubbed “organizational needs,” great
7
significance in his assignment decisions.
In the pages that follow, I will discuss the agenda-setting capacity
of opinion assignment. As will be evident, the Chief is able to guide—
or manipulate—the Court’s deliberation toward options that he most
favors, either producing policy gain or minimizing policy loss. This
tendency is accentuated in unanimous or near-unanimous cases, but
suppressed when the Chief has a fragile majority to preserve. I then
discuss the Chief’s pursuit of the Court’s organizational needs
through opinion assignment. As one sees in Justice Douglas’s letter, it
has often been asserted that the Chief’s assignment decisions can affect the smooth operation of the Court. Finally, I offer empirical evidence of the causal factors that guided Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion assignment decisions from the 1986 to the 1993 Terms.
I. THE ASSIGNMENT OF MAJORITY OPINIONS
When the Chief Justice is in the majority at the conference discussion following oral arguments, it falls to him to assign the majority
8
opinion. On those occasions when the Chief is in the conference
minority, the senior Associate Justice in the majority receives the re9
sponsibility of assigning the opinion. At the conclusion of every oral

6

Draft Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
(May 1, 1972) [hereinafter Douglas letter] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review). This letter was written to protest Burger’s practice of passing at conference before later casting a vote with the majority and then assigning the opinion.
Douglas never sent this letter to Burger, but kept it in his case file.
7
See Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 423-24 (1996) (“[S]tudents of the
Court have proposed an ‘organizational needs’ model in which the Chief distributes
the workload evenly among justices, assigns cases to those justices who are most efficient and encourages specialization by routinely assigning similar cases to the same
justice.” (citations omitted)).
8
ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 28
(1986).
9
See Sandra Lee Wood, In the Shadow of the Chief: The Role of the Senior Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court 15-16 ( J une 1994) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania) (explaining that “[o]pinion assignment (when the Chief disagrees) is certainly one” of the prerogatives of the senior Associate Justice).
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argument session, which lasts two weeks, the Chief Justice distributes
an assignment sheet to each chambers. Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked, “When I was an associate justice I eagerly awaited the assign10
ments.” This assignment sheet lists the assignments made to the Justices, as well as the identity of the assignor if it is not the Chief
11
Justice.
What accounts for the Chief Justice’s choice in assigning opinions? In large part, political scientists explain this choice as an effort
by the Chief Justice to advance his own strategic policy objectives,
while meeting the Court’s organizational needs. Most political scientists who study decision making on the Court point to the Justices’ policy preferences as the primary factor. This common perspective assumes that Justices seek to further the legal outcomes that most
12
closely comport with their own personal policy goals. The central
role of policy preferences is evident in Justices’ decisions to grant or
13
deny certiorari petitions, in their efforts to bargain with and accom-

10

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 296
(1987).
11
If an Associate Justice assigns the opinion, his or her identity is revealed by initials next to the assignment. Associate Justices assigned 14.1% of opinions during the
Burger Court, FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 32 (2000), and 18.9% during
the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck,
Opinion Assignment on the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 121, 123 (2005).
12
See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 23 (1998)
(“[M]ost justices in most cases pursue policy; that is, they want to move the substantive
content of law as close as possible to their preferred position.”); MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS &
WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 18 (“Supreme Court justices are strategic actors who pursue their policy preferences within the strategic constraints of a case and the Court.”);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (arguing that the best-supported explanation for Justices’
decision making is the “attitudinal model,” which holds that “the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes of the
justices”).
13
Certiorari decisions have been explained as a means to provide uniformity in
the face of conflicting lower court decisions, S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 901, 910 (1984),
but also as a mechanism to “pursue . . . policy goals by deciding cases with maximum
potential impact on political, social, or economic policy,” Gregory A. Caldeira & John
R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1109, 1111 (1988), and as strategic calculations to avoid consideration of
cases whose outcomes could run counter to their preferences, Gregory A. Caldeira,
John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 566 (1999).
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14

modate their colleagues, and even in their decisions to write sepa15
rate opinions.
Opinion assignment is thus seen by those who maintain the primacy of policy seeking on the Court as a means by which the Chief
Justice pursues his policy goals. As David Rohde and Harold Spaeth
put it, “the rational strategy for the assignor is to assign the opinion to
the justice whose views are most like his own on the issue being de16
cided.” This approach has two potential effects: maximizing policy
gain and minimizing policy loss. When the Chief Justice’s preferred
outcome is in ascendancy, he can maximize policy gain by assigning
the opinion either to himself or to someone whose views are similar to
his own. In contrast, when the Chief’s views do not hold sway at conference, he can minimize policy loss by joining the majority and assigning the opinion to the Justice in the majority who will do the least
damage to legal policy, as he sees it. As Abe Fortas once wrote: “If the
Chief Justice assigns the writing of the opinion of the Court to Mr. Justice A, a statement of profound consequence may emerge. If he assigns it to Mr. Justice B, the opinion of the Court may be of limited
17
consequence.”
Conceptually, the Chief uses opinion assignment to influence the
Court by using it as an agenda-setting tool. First, by selecting who will
draft the majority opinion, the Chief Justice can direct which policy
alternatives will receive consideration by the Court. As Justice Douglas
asserted in his unpublished Roe opinion, the purpose of the confer-

14

MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 100 (asserting that the
“paramount” factor shaping accommodation in opinion writing “is the ideological distance between the author and the other justices at the initial conference who expressed support for the majority position”); James F. Spriggs II, Forrest Maltzman &
Paul J. Wahlbeck, Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices’ Responses to Majority
Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 485 (1999) (asserting, with empirical support, that “justices decide how to respond [to majority opinion drafts] based on the effect a choice
will have on securing their policy goals”); Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II &
Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United
States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 294 (1998) (finding that an examination of
the number of majority opinion drafts circulated demonstrates that an author’s accommodation is influenced, in part, by the Justices’ bargaining tactics).
15
See Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Forrest Maltzman, The Politics of Dissents and Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. Q. 488, 489 (1999) (arguing
that “separate opinions result from the justices’ pursuit of their policy preferences
within both strategic and institutional constraints”).
16
DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 174
(1976).
17
Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma of Leadership, 84 YALE L.J. 405, 405
(1975).
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ence discussion is to determine the Court’s consensus for disposing of
a case, with the assigned author serving as an agent to draft an opin18
ion consistent with that consensus. But the opinion author is able to
direct the Court’s policy-making attention to a particular policy alternative. In this way, the assigned author has the capacity to set the
agenda for the Court, similar to what we see with government officials
in other branches who are responsible for recommending a policy al19
ternative from among a set.
Second, opinion assignment enables the Chief Justice to set the
Court’s agenda not only by influencing which alternatives the Court
considers, but also by guiding the order in which they are consid20
ered. Since the majority opinion is circulated before other Justices’
draft dissents or concurrences, the majority author can secure preliminary commitments from her colleagues prior to their consideration of competing opinions. Moreover, an assigned author who does
not favor the majority view may attempt to form a new majority by
adding an alternative to the debate that may not have been consid21
ered previously by the Justices.
II. CONSTRAINTS ON AGENDA SETTING
Even though the Chief Justice can use opinion assignment to advance his policy goals, he cannot pursue that objective without constraint. The Chief operates within limits created either by the press of
other goals that he values, such as a harmonious and smoothly operating Court, or by norms that limit his ability to pursue single-mindedly

18

Douglas memorandum, supra note 4, at 1-3.
See generally Thomas H. Hammond, Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and
Bureaucratic Politics, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 379 (1986) (comparing agenda control in the
administrative and legislative contexts).
20
See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION, at xi (1986) (examining how the “preferences of individual members of a group are amalgamated into
a decision for the group as a whole”); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE 169-95 (1982) (presenting an empirical analysis of the role a group’s
leader plays in controlling the agenda of the group’s decision-making process). Some
scholars of legislative behavior suggest that congressional committees are able to control outcomes through their control over the conference report, which constitutes the
final proposal. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 87 (1987) (describing “proposal power” as one of “the foundation[s] of committee power”).
21
See Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme
Court, 14 J. THEORETICAL POL. 93, 96-98 (2002) (exploring the notion that adding alternatives can divide a majority).
19

2006]

SUPREME COURT OPINION ASSIGNMENT

1735

22

policy-based assignments.
As the latter view suggests, the choices
available to the Chief may be limited by the expectations held by his
colleagues. These expectations could be shaped by formal rules, such
as the number of Justices needed to form a majority, or by informal
23
norms, like an equitable distribution of opinions. Another way to
conceptualize the linkage of these goals is to recognize that the Chief
24
Justice, as the Court’s task leader, may pursue multiple goals simul25
taneously.
The Chief’s pursuit of nonpolicy goals will necessarily
hamper his ability to maximize policy gain in each case.
As such, the Chief uses the opinion assignment power to enhance
the legitimacy of the Court’s opinions, promote harmony on the
bench, and ensure that the Court completes its work in a timely fashion. These goals can be, and according to many studies are, met by
paying heed to each Justice’s share of the Court’s workload, efficiency
26
in completing her assigned opinions, and issue specialization. Chief
22

Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment
on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 551, 551 (2004).
23
See JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 53-66 (1992) (reviewing
the role of institutions and expectations in strategic choice); JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN
P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 2126 (1989) (listing sources of rules that constrain or dictate behavior); DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 36-53
(1990) (discussing the role of informal and formal constraints on human interaction).
24
See David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the
Supreme Court, in THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: READINGS IN PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR
147, 147-48 (Sheldon Goldman & Thomas P. Jahnige eds., 1968) (reviewing the
Chief’s leadership responsibilities).
25
See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 23-56 (1997) (identifying the “diverse array of goals” pursued by Justices); GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES:
RATIONAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 7-10 (1990) (arguing that rational decision makers simultaneously play multiple games based on different goals). Maltzman
and Wahlbeck find empirical support for the multiple-goal perspective over the view
that the Chief is constrained only by the Court’s organizational needs. Maltzman &
Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 561.
26
See Saul Brenner, Issue Specialization as a Variable in Opinion Assignment on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 46 J. POL. 1217, 1217-18 (1984) (enumerating the possible rationales for
issue specialization); Saul Brenner & Jan Palmer, The Time Taken To Write Opinions as a
Determinant of Opinion Assignments, 72 JUDICATURE 179, 182-84 (1988) (identifying efficiency in completing earlier opinions as a significant factor in opinion assignment);
Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Issue Specialization in Majority Opinion Assignment on
the Burger Court, 39 W. POL. Q. 520, 523 (1986) (finding “evidence of specialization”);
Davis, supra note 1, at 72 (examining the success of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s stated
goal of distributing opinions evenly); Elliot E. Slotnick, The Equality Principle & Majority
Opinion Assignment on the United States Supreme Court, 12 POLITY 318, 318-20 (1979) (discussing the complex reasoning in opinion assignment, particularly the equality norm);
Harold J. Spaeth, Distributive Justice: Majority Opinion Assignments in the Burger Court, 67
JUDICATURE 299, 300 (1984) (studying “assignment equality”).
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Justice Rehnquist claimed to pay particular attention to these considerations. On November 24, 1989, Rehnquist sent a memo to the Conference reiterating his attention to equity, but giving notice that he
planned to give additional weight to the Justices’ abilities to complete
27
their assigned tasks. Rehnquist, despite his expressed emphasis on
these considerations, was not unique. Assignments made by Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger suggest that Rehnquist’s prede28
cessors also took these factors into consideration.
Inevitably, the organizational needs of the Court and the Chief
Justice’s strategic policy considerations can conflict when the Chief
Justice assigns one of his colleagues the task of writing for a majority
of the Court. Unlike the Chief Justice, Associate Justices who make
assignments do not have to balance these competing considerations,
as they do not fill the institutional leadership role that the Chief does.
This leaves Associate Justices freer to advance their policy goals
29
through opinion assignment.
Although the conflict between the
pursuit of policy goals and the safeguarding of the Court’s organizational needs underlies much of the criticism of Chief Justice Burger’s
assignment decisions, Rehnquist publicly stated that he allowed the
organizational needs of the Court to trump strategic policy considera30
tions.
While some differences emerge from studies of different
Chief Justices, they tend to weigh factors in a similar manner.
III. OPINION ASSIGNMENT AS AGENDA SETTING
The capacity of opinion assignment for agenda setting, and the
Chief Justice’s use of it to minimize policy loss, is vividly illustrated in
31
the 1972 case of Loper v. Beto. In 1969, Otis Loper filed one of “a
steady succession of petitions” for habeas corpus to challenge his 1947

27

Memorandum from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Conference, Policy Regarding Assignments (Nov. 24, 1989) [hereinafter Rehnquist memorandum] (on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (“[I]t only makes sense in the assignment of additional work to give some preference to those who are ‘current’ with
respect to past work.”).
28
See MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 35-53 (identifying and
quantifying the factors used in assignments by Chief Justices Burger and Warren);
Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 558 (revealing that expertise, equity, ideology,
and efficiency played into the assignment decisions of each Chief Justice).
29
MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 40.
30
See REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 297 (“I take into consideration the extent to
which the various justices are current [in their workload].”).
31
405 U.S. 473 (1972).
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32

conviction for raping his stepdaughter. At issue was whether “the
use of prior, void convictions for impeachment purposes deprive[s] a
criminal defendant of due process of law where their use might well
33
have influenced the outcome of the case.” At his 1947 trial, Loper
testified on his own behalf, maintaining that he had not assaulted his
stepdaughter. During cross-examination, Loper conceded that he
had four felony convictions between 1931 and 1940. The jury found
Loper guilty and sentenced him to fifty years in prison. In 1969,
Loper claimed that the convictions that were used to impeach his testimony had been obtained without the benefit of counsel. This claim
was supported by his sworn testimony and court records. Although his
petition for habeas corpus was denied by the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, a decision which was later affirmed by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
34
to hear Loper’s appeal.
At conference, according to the records of several retired Justices,
including Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the conference expressed
support for three distinct dispositions: affirm the lower court
(Rehnquist), remand for resentencing (Burger and Powell), and reverse the lower courts and remand for a new trial (Brennan, Stewart,
35
White, Marshall, and Brennan). Douglas was absent from the arguments and did not cast a conference vote, although he later voted to
remand for a new trial.
If Brennan’s and Powell’s docket sheets are an accurate record of
the conference vote, the duty to assign the task of writing the majority
opinion would fall to Justice Brennan as the senior Justice in the conference majority. However, the assignment sheet for the January argument session that Chief Justice Burger circulated on January 25,
1972, indicated that Burger assigned himself this opinion. In particular, Burger assigned this opinion as a per curiam to dismiss the case as
32

Loper v. Beto, 440 F.2d 934, 936 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
Loper was paroled after serving fifteen years of his sentence. With his release, he received permission to move to Mississippi. Loper’s parole was cut short, however, following his arrest for stealing a car. Before Loper could be moved back to the Texas
Department of Corrections, he escaped from the Carthage, Mississippi, jail and remained at large for more than a year. After his eventual capture, he was taken to
Texas where he was again incarcerated. Id.
33
Loper v. Beto, 404 U.S. 821 (1971) (mem.), granting cert. to 440 F.2d 934 (5th
Cir. 1971).
34
The facts of Loper were derived from the Supreme Court’s opinion. 405 U.S. at
474-80.
35
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Jan.
26, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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improvidently granted (DIG). Brennan responded the next day with
his letter recounting the vote that he had recorded in his personal
notes, and stating that as the senior Justice in the conference majority,
he would assign the opinion to Potter Stewart. He said, “I had supposed in that circumstance it would fall to me to assign the opinion.
The assignment sheet, however, shows that you have assigned it to
yourself to write an opinion dismissing [the appeal] as improvidently
36
granted. No one seems to have cast that vote.” Justice Stewart also
wrote to the Chief to corroborate Brennan’s version of the conference
vote: “My notes do not show that anyone at Conference voted to dis37
miss this case as improvidently granted.”
While Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the confusion over the
38
assignment, he still maintained that a “‘DIG’ might be possible.” He
concluded his memo by claiming, “Since I voted to reverse or ‘DIG’ I
will make the assignment for whichever of those two finally commands
39
a majority.”
There is no evidence in the notes taken by Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, or Powell to confirm Burger’s assertion. Each
recorded his preference for remanding the case for resentencing.
Blackmun alone mentioned a DIG in his conference notes, quoting
Byron White who was “sorry we took case. But painted into corner.
40
Clearly [a] miscarriage . . . [could] DIG.” White decided, however, that
precedent dictated a new trial.
There are two ways in which the Chief attempted to control the
agenda in Loper: first, by using sophisticated voting to join the majority and select an opinion author who would minimize policy loss, and
second, by proposing an alternative to the view supported by the majority. Burger perhaps sought to minimize policy loss by casting a sophisticated vote. In a multi-stage voting process, a sophisticated vote is
one in which a person votes against her most preferred alternative in
the first stage in order to obtain a better outcome in the second and
final stage. As Calvert and Fenno described it in the congressional setting, sophisticated voting occurs “when a legislator votes against an
amendment that he or she favors in principle, in order to improve

36

Id.
Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Jan. 26,
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
38
Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Jan. 26,
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
39
Id.
40
Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes (Jan. 1972) (on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review).
37
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41

chances for passage of the bill itself.” In the Supreme Court, sophisticated voting occurs when a Justice votes for what she views as a
suboptimal alternative at conference in order to obtain a more favorable final outcome. Chief Justice Burger had been previously accused
of casting “phony votes” whereby, as one Justice put it, he voted “with
the majority so as to assign the opinion, and then he ends up in dis42
sent.”
In the absence of a clear statement of his sincere preference in
Loper, one must divine whether Burger’s conference vote was based on
insincere preferences on the basis of his voting record in similar cases.
In other right-to-counsel cases, Burger had supported the prosecution
83.9% of the time and had always supported the government in cases
43
involving prejudicial statements like those involved in Loper.
Rehnquist, the lone Justice who supported affirming the lower courts
in Loper, favored the government in 86.0% of right-to-counsel cases.
In contrast, for instance, Justice Stewart, to whom Justice Brennan
sought to assign the decision in Loper, voted for the accused in 69.7%
of the Court’s right-to-counsel cases during his tenure on the bench.
Armed with these statistics, one might reasonably conclude that Chief
Justice Burger cast his vote to remand not because he sincerely preferred this outcome, but rather because he sought to guide the Court
through opinion assignment to a less damaging decision on the merits. In Loper, Burger could assign the case to one of several Justices
who might be counted on to write a narrow opinion. In hindsight,
Harry Blackmun, who switched to the dissent, or Byron White, who
ultimately concurred in the result, would have provided a more acceptable opinion to Burger than would the remaining majority Jus-

41

Randall L. Calvert & Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the
Senate, 56 J. POL. 349, 349 (1994). Other scholars have examined sophisticated voting
in Congress. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Michael C. Munger, Investigating the Incidence
of Killer Amendments in Congress, 65 J. POL. 498, 499 (2003) (discussing the use of sophisticated voting in response to the introduction of a “killer amendment”); Andrew D.
Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
361, 364-66 (2001) (identifying scenarios in which sophisticated voting increases);
Craig Volden, Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings, 60 J. POL. 149, 151 (1998)
(arguing that sophisticated voting rises where supermajorities are required to override
a veto or end a filibuster).
42
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 45
(1996).
43
These preference indicators are derived from Harold J. Spaeth, The S. Sidney
Ulmer Project: U.S. Supreme Court Databases, The Original United States Supreme
Court Judicial Database 1953-2005 Terms, http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
sctdata.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
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44

tices.
When this gambit failed, however, Chief Justice Burger relented and released the prerogative to assign the opinion to Douglas,
45
who cast a vote to reverse by memo on January 27, 1972.
Second, the Chief Justice used the opinion assignment to intro46
duce an alternative disposition.
Although three distinct positions
gained adherents at conference, Chief Justice Burger assigned the
opinion in Loper for a fourth disposition. This undoubtedly was his
attempt to divide the otherwise solid majority in favor of remanding
the case for a new trial. In essence, a strategic leader can propose a
new alternative that will introduce instability in the form of a voting
47
cycle. If a vote had pit the Justices supporting remand for resentencing against those favoring remand for a new trial, the conference
would have supported a new trial. But it is possible, as Burger
claimed, that the DIG disposition might have defeated the remand for
a new trial disposition. This voting instability appealed to Burger as it
allowed him to minimize his presumed policy loss if a majority of his
colleagues would find a DIG preferable to the outcome they initially
supported at conference.
The effect on voting stability of adding an alternative is apparent
in the Justices’ preference orderings. Assume that Burger had the following preference orderings over the two dominant conference positions:
Remand for Resentencing > Remand for New Trial
44

Blackmun supported the prosecution in 51.2% of right-to-counsel cases, while
White sided with the government in 70.8% of these cases.
45
See Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
(Jan. 27, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (voting to reverse despite having abstained at conference); Letter from Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger to Justice William O. Douglas (Jan. 31, 1972) (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review) (confirming Douglas’s vote and indicating that Douglas
should assign the opinion); Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger (Jan. 31, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (allowing the earlier assignment of the opinion to Justice Stewart to stand).
46
Other Justices can propose alternatives in opinions they circulate to the Court,
but the Chief Justice can initiate this switch with the opinion assignment. For instance,
Justice Brennan’s first draft for the majority in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582
(1990), was accompanied by a cover letter that said, “Although I originally voted to affirm the judgment of the state court, I now believe that the proper disposition of the
case, given our conclusions, is to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. Accordingly, I have styled the draft opinion in this manner.” Memorandum
from Justice William J. Brennan to the Conference (May 31, 1991) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
47
See Epstein & Shvetsova, supra note 21, at 98 (discussing how the Chief Justice
can create a cycle of preferences so as to control the agenda).
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In contrast, the majority’s preference ordering was:
Remand for New Trial > Remand for Resentencing
White’s comments at conference, however, suggested that another alternative, a DIG, might be able to siphon votes from the majority.
White made clear that his preference ordering was:
DIG > Remand for New Trial > Remand for Resentencing
Although White would support a remand for a new trial over a remand for resentencing, it was reasonable to conclude that he might
be persuaded to cast a vote to DIG the case.
In light of the controversy over Burger’s assignment, the conference discussed this case again on January 27. At that time, according
to Blackmun’s notes, several Justices voiced support for a DIG, includ48
ing the Chief Justice and Powell. Rehnquist continued to assert that
his preference was to affirm the lower court. Stewart argued that a
“DIG would be the last thing to do” and that “we are obligated to decide” the case. White stated that “I voted to deny. . . . But we did grant
49
it. Our decision—reverse.” Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, which
concluded with his stated preference for a DIG, attracted the support
of Justice Blackmun. Blackmun switched from his conference vote to
remand for a new trial to Rehnquist’s dissent, which supported either
a DIG or an affirmance of the lower court. Ultimately, Rehnquist’s

48

See Blackmun, supra note 40 (recording that Burger voted to “[e]ither DIG or
R[everse] & remand” and that Powell “c[oul]d DIG”).
49
Id. In following this course of action, White adhered to a strict interpretation of
the Rule of Four and DIGs. See Scott A. Hendrickson, To DIG or Not To DIG: Using
DIGs to Examine Supreme Court Decision Making and Agenda Setting 8 n.15 (Working Paper 2003), http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~sahendri/workingpaper/apsa03.pdf
(noting that White “digged certiorari over the dissent of the only four justices . . . who
had voted to grant” it in Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497 (1971)).
For New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam), Justice John Paul Stevens
wrote a private letter to Justice Brennan saying that he could join Brennan’s per curiam opinion dismissing the case as improvidently granted if one of the original four
votes to grant joined as well. Stevens added, “I am most reluctant, however, to join this
kind of disposition over the dissent of the four Members of the Court who voted to
grant the case, even though, as you know, I think this was a particularly unwise grant.”
Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William J. Brennan (Mar. 1, 1984) (on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Interestingly, White dissented in
Uplinger, claiming that the case was properly before the Supreme Court and should be
addressed. He concluded that a DIG was not the “proper course.” 467 U.S. at 252
(White, J., dissenting). In Loper, there were seven sitting Justices when certiorari was
granted on the votes of Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall.
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opinion won the support of four Justices, but not of Justice White,
who wrote an opinion concurring in the result.
IV. CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF AGENDA SETTING
The Chief Justice does not uniformly assign opinions to his allies,
as the agenda-setting argument would hypothesize. Indeed, there are
instances where a strategic Chief will signal a retreat from this goal.
Most notably, the Chief may reach beyond his usual allies when the
majority is particularly fragile. The literature has maintained that the
Chief Justice, when facing a narrow majority, may be more likely to assign the opinion to a moderate member of the Court. Two distinct
reasons have been given for this tactic: first, this would avoid the
breakup of the Chief’s majority coalition, and second, it may encour50
age dissenters to join the opinion of the Court. By assigning this
opinion to a more ideologically distant Justice in an effort to maintain
a majority for his preferred disposition, the Chief minimizes policy
loss.
The risk associated with assigning an opinion to a Justice close to
one of the ideological extremes was evident in United States v. Glaxo
51
Group Ltd. Glaxo concerned an antitrust claim against British drug
manufacturers stemming from their sublicensing agreements with
American companies to sell their product while prohibiting bulk sales
of their drug without prior approval. The District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the government, finding that these
bulk sales restraints were a violation of the Sherman Act. As a remedy,
the government sought to invalidate the underlying patents, but the
district court denied this relief because the companies did not rely on
52
their patents to defend the antitrust claim.

50

See Danelski, supra note 24, at 156-57 (explaining how the Chief’s assignments
may influence the disposition of a case). Some have found that this strategy may not
work, as moderate Justices are not more likely to maintain the original coalition than
their more extreme colleagues, see, e.g., Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Majority
Opinion Assignments and the Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court, 32
AM. J. POL. SCI. 72, 80 (1988) (summarizing the results of an empirical study of Supreme Court coalitions), and dissenters are not more likely to join a moderate’s opinion, see Saul Brenner et al., Increasing the Size of Minimum Winning Original Coalitions on
the Warren Court, 23 POLITY 309, 315 (1990) (describing a bivariate analysis of the Warren Court coalitions and how often moderate opinions are joined by original dissenters).
51
410 U.S. 52 (1973).
52
Id. at 56.
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After the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case on November 9, 1972, six Justices voted at conference to affirm the district
court’s decision. Since the Chief Justice and the two most senior Associate Justices, Douglas and Brennan, formed the conference minority, the power to assign the opinion fell to Justice Stewart. Stewart informed Chief Justice Burger on November 13, 1972, that “I have asked
53
Bill Rehnquist to write the opinion for the Court in this case.”
This choice, according to much of the literature, was not the optimal move; instead, opinion writing should have been delegated to
the Justice at the ideological center of the Court, that is, the median
Justice. In 1972, the Court median in economic cases was Stewart
54
himself. Instead, as seen in Figure 1, Stewart assigned the opinion to
one of the conference majority Justices closest to the conservative
pole, Justice Rehnquist. The risk in assigning the opinion to one of
these Justices was that it could alienate the Justices closest to the dissenters, prompting them to abandon their conference position in fa55
vor of the minority view. The conference majority Justices who were
most at risk of defection were Justice White, who disagreed with
Rehnquist in economic cases about 29% of the time, and Justice Marshall, who supported the conservative, or pro-business, position in less
than half of the Court’s previous economic cases. The strategically
wise assignment would have been one of these Justices.

53

Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Nov. 13,
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
54
As a measure of ideology, I used the data from Spaeth, supra note 43, to calculate the percentage of cases in which a Justice voted in a liberal direction in each value
area in Terms prior to the one in which the case was considered. I estimate a new Justice’s ideology following the method discussed in Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs
II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 349, 361-62 (2005) (modeling future voting behavior on Spaeth’s data and
distance from the Court’s median).
55
Studies of the fluidity of Justices’ votes between conference and the final recorded vote on the merits show that a Justice is more likely to change her vote when
the dissent is closer to her own views than the majority opinion author. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger
Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581, 588 (1996).
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Figure 1: United States v. Glaxo in Ideological Space 56
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The consequence of this strategic error was apparent as soon as
Justice Rehnquist’s draft majority opinion circulated on November 22,
1972. Justice White responded by remarking that he had “second
thoughts” and was “considering a dissent with respect to the Government’s authority in specified situations to demonstrate the invalidity
57
of a patent.” After White circulated his dissent a week later, Justice
Marshall added his voice to the mounting opposition to Rehnquist’s
draft. Marshall wrote Rehnquist on November 28, 1972, stating that
he was “somewhere between Douglas and White. I am sorry I cannot
58
join your opinion insofar as remedy is concerned.” The day after
White’s proposed dissent was circulated, Marshall joined White’s dissent.
With these two defections, the ranks of the Justices opposing
Rehnquist’s opinion had swollen from the three original dissenters to
a majority of five Justices. Chief Justice Burger promptly responded to
this development by writing a memorandum to the conference: “It
appears that the resolution of this case is undergoing some evolution
and that Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s proposed opinion does not enlist a
59
majority.” He then reassigned the majority opinion to Justice White.
Later, and without comment, Justice Powell also switched sides and
joined White’s opinion on December 27, 1972, making the final tally
60
six to three to reverse the lower court’s decision.

56

Note: Conference majority Justices in italics.
Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Nov. 27,
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
58
Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Nov.
28, 1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
59
Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Dec. 7,
1972) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
60
United States v. Glaxo, 410 U.S. 52, 53 (1973).
57
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A few years later, a chastened Justice Stewart wrote to Chief Justice
61
Burger when assigning opinions in Tully v. Griffin, Inc. and United
62
States v. Foster Lumber Co. following close conference votes:
I was asked to assign the opinions in both of these cases, which were the
subjects of closely divided Conference votes. Having in mind my dismal
track record as an assignor (see, e.g., U.S. v. Glaxco [sic] Group Ltd., 410
U.S. 52), I have decided to undertake both opinions myself, rather than
63
inflict them upon any of my colleagues in the fragile majorities.

Of course, had Stewart assigned Glaxo to himself, the Court median in economic cases in 1972, he very well might have avoided the
eventual debate and switch in outcomes.
V. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS
Not only is the effect of agenda-setting policy calculations conditioned by the size of the conference majority, but Chief Justices are
apt to place greater weight on policy views when assigning cases that
promise to make a significant contribution to public or legal policy.
Underlying this weighting is the assumption that cases are not of
equal worth in the eyes of the Justices. Justice Powell once complained to Chief Justice Burger that he had been assigned “two lemons
64
last months [sic] (two Social Security statutory construction cases).”
In contrast, Rehnquist commented that, as an Associate Justice, he
“eagerly awaited the assignments” as “the office offers no greater reward than the opportunity to author an opinion on an important

61

429 U.S. 68 (1976)
429 U.S. 32 (1976).
63
Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Oct. 8,
1976) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
64
Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
(Mar. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Powell memorandum] (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review). Chief Justice Burger sent a note to Justice Powell during
arguments in UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986), criticizing Powell’s vote to grant certiorari. During oral arguments, Burger passed Powell a note saying, “You can pay
$25.00 to the Coffee Fund—for taking this case. If it turns out ‘right’ you can work out
your fine by writing it!” Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice
Lewis F. Powell (Mar. 25, 1986) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Powell responded by writing a check for $25 and passing it to Burger with a
note that said, “I did ‘blow it’ by voting to grant. I’ll pay the $25 (check enclosed) on
assurance the case will not be assigned to me! After all you gave me two lemons last
months [sic] (two Social Security statutory construction cases). Also I’m still hurting
from having to write Matsushita [Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986)].” Powell memorandum, supra. Chief Justice Burger refused the check.
62
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65

point of constitutional law.” Research shows that the Chief Justice
gives greater weight to a colleague’s ideology in politically salient cas66
67
es and disproportionately self-assigns legally salient cases.
The
agenda-setting explanation would maintain that assignments to allies
in these cases serve the Chief Justice by ensuring policy gains in these
especially important cases.
VI. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
While opinion assignment offers the Chief Justice a potent
weapon to shape the law, most recent Chief Justices have asserted that
they eschewed those concerns and attempted to assign opinions fairly
to their colleagues. Chief Justice Earl Warren remarked, “I do believe
that if [the assignment process] wasn’t done with regard to fairness, it
68
could well lead to great disruption in the Court.” Rehnquist maintained that he tried “to be as evenhanded as possible as far as numbers
69
of cases assigned to each justice.” The Chief Justice does not have
unbounded power to pursue his policy-based interests. The Chief
confronts the needs of the Court as an organization.
One of the principal constraints on the Chief Justice’s assignments
is the norm to equitably distribute opinions to the Justices. Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that during his first three Terms as Chief, “the
principal rule I have followed in assigning opinions is to give everyone
approximately the same number of assignments of opinions for the
70
Court during any one Term.” Although Rehnquist explicitly mentioned his benchmark as equity within the Term, an intermediate equity goal is the distribution of opinions from each argument session.
65

REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 296.
MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 11, at 35-36; Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 552; David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority
Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652, 655 (1972);
Elliot E. Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignments from Taft to Burger, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 60, 60-62 (1979); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use of Power in the Supreme
Court: The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren, 1953-1960, 19 J. PUB. L. 49, 67 (1970).
67
Saul Brenner, The Chief Justices’ Self Assignment of Majority Opinions in Salient Cases,
30 SOC. SCI. J. 143, 144 (1993); Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 552; Rohde,
supra note 66, at 656; Elliot E. Slotnick, The Chief Justices and Self-Assignment of Majority
Opinions, 31 W. POL. Q. 219, 219 (1978).
68
Anthony Lewis, A Talk with Warren on Crime, the Court, the Country, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Oct. 19, 1969, at 130.
69
REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 297.
70
Memorandum from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Conference, Policy Regarding Assignments (Nov. 24, 1989) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
66
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The Justices’ correspondence is replete with references to their
desire to maintain balance across the chambers within an assignment
cycle. Almost apologetically, Chief Justice Burger wrote a cover letter
to the conference accompanying the assignments, stating that “[w]ith
71
only seven cases, there was not enough to ‘go around.’” The desire
to maintain equity within an assignment cycle is also seen in the Justices’ efforts to trade assignments if a Justice received an assignment
that she could not complete. When Justice Powell received the as72
signment in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., he announced that,
given his position favoring dismissal for want of an adequately presented federal question, he could not write a per curiam opinion for
the Court without also authoring a dissent. Burger replied, “I accept
your ‘abdication’. However there is no occasion for a ‘trade’ since
there is no comparable canine special in the last week’s ‘litter’. I will
73
74
ask someone else to try to deal with this critter.” In Fiallo v. Bell,
another case where a trade was not feasible, Burger wrote that he
75
would make it up “on the ‘next round.’”
In addition to concerns about equity, Chief Justices have expressed an interest in facilitating the timely completion of the Court’s
workload. The Justices are acutely aware of the “June crunch,” when
the Court finishes its work on cases heard during the Term—many
memos among the Justices allude to the coming end of the Court’s
Term. As the Court’s administrative leader, the Chief Justice has responsibility for prodding his colleagues to fulfill their obligations before the end of June. Chief Justice Burger once prompted his colleagues, “This is the time of the year when we remind ourselves of the
76
May 31 ‘target date’ to have all assigned opinions in circulation.”
This constraint affects the Chief Justices’ opinion assignment practices as they seek “to avoid the annual ‘June crunch,’ at which time so
77
much of our work seems to pile up.” In a memorandum to the Conference on November 24, 1989, Chief Justice Rehnquist informed his
71

Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Oct. 15,
1977) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
72
445 U.S. 308 (1980).
73
Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Lewis F. Powell (Dec. 10,
1979) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
74
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
75
Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (Dec. 13,
1976) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
76
Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the Conference (May 10,
1983) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
77
REHNQUIST, supra note 10, at 297.
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colleagues that he would “put more weight than I have in the past on”
whether a chambers has overdue uncirculated majority or dissenting
78
opinions or delinquent votes. Although Rehnquist moved such efficiency to the forefront of his assignment calculus, other Chief Justices
were likewise motivated by their colleagues’ propensity to complete
opinion-writing chores quickly. In a study of assignments made by the
Chief Justice between 1953 and 1990, Maltzman and Wahlbeck found
that selections by these Chiefs were explained, in part, by which Justice could promptly complete opinion writing, especially as the end of
79
the Court’s term approached.
VII. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST’S OPINION ASSIGNMENTS
Whereas Chief Justice Burger was often criticized for trying to im80
pose his will on the Court through opinion assignments, research
indicates that Chief Justice Rehnquist was not motivated by ideological
concerns in his assignment decisions. A study of assignments between
1987 and 1989 reveals that Rehnquist did not systematically assign
81
opinions to his closest allies. In contrast, the study of assignments
from the 1953 to the 1990 Terms found empirical support for the sup82
position that Chief Justices favor their allies.
The question that I
now address is whether Rehnquist sought to direct the Court and its
doctrinal development through the exercise of this prerogative.
I used the files maintained by Justice Blackmun, currently housed
at the Library of Congress, to identify Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assignments during the Terms between 1986 and 1993. The papers contain the assignment sheets circulated by both Chief Justices Burger
and Rehnquist. These assignment sheets are the original sources
through which Justices received their writing assignments. If one were
to simply consult the final opinions to ascertain who assigned the majority opinion or who received the assignment, one would introduce
significant measurement error. Looking at the assignors, first, if one
assumed the opinion was assigned by the most senior Justice in the final majority coalition, one would be wrong in the 23.9% of cases in
which someone other than Rehnquist actually assigned the opinion
even though Rehnquist ultimately joined the majority coalition. Sec-

78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 552-53.
Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 439.
Id. at 421.
Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 22, at 558.
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ond, one would be mistaken in assuming that the eventual majority
author received the initial assignment, in 5.2% of the cases assigned
by the Chief Justice. Thus, rather than examine the published opinions to attribute assignments, I limit the following analysis to those
Terms for which original assignment sheets are available.
According to the assignment sheets found in Blackmun’s papers,
Rehnquist assigned a substantial share of the majority opinions during
this portion of his tenure as Chief, as seen in Table 1. Justice Brennan
assigned the most majority opinions among Associate Justices, assigning more than 10% of all opinions for the 1986-1993 period, despite
his retirement following the 1989 Term. Table 2 presents the number
of assignments made to each Justice by Chief Justice Rehnquist or an
Associate Justice. As that table shows, Chief Justice Rehnquist selfassigned frequently, retaining more assignments for himself than he
delegated to any other single Justice. The other Justices who were
regular beneficiaries of Rehnquist assignments were White, Stevens,
O’Connor, and Scalia. These data also show that Justices Brennan,
White, Blackmun, and Stevens received numerous assignments from
the Court’s Associate Justices.

Table 1: Justices Who Assigned Majority Opinions:
1986-1993 Terms
Assigning Justice

Number Assigned

% of Total

William H. Rehnquist

791

81.0

William J. Brennan, Jr.

102

10.5

41

4.2

1

0.1

Byron R. White
Thurgood Marshall
Harry A. Blackmun

27

2.8

John Paul Stevens

10

1.0

Sandra Day O’Connor
Total

4

0.4

976

100.0

1750
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Table 2: Justices Who Received Assignments:
1986-1993 Terms

Justice
William H. Rehnquist

Number of
Assignments Made
by Rehnquist
123

(15.5)

Number of
Assignments Made by
Associate Justices
0

(0.0)

Percent of
Eligible
Assignments
15.4

William J. Brennan, Jr.

26

(3.3)

37

(20.0)

18.5

Byron R. White

91

(11.5)

23

(12.4)

15.6

Thurgood Marshall

58

(7.3)

14

(7.6)

18.0

Harry A. Blackmun

68

(8.6)

25

(13.5)

14.2

Lewis F. Powell

18

(2.3)

2

(1.1)

15.8

John Paul Stevens

89

(11.3)

27

(14.6)

18.1

Sandra Day O’Connor

106

(13.4)

14

(7.6)

15.8

Antonin Scalia

89

(11.3)

14

(7.6)

13.4

Anthony M. Kennedy

61

(7.7)

16

(8.6)

12.1

David H. Souter

32

(4.0)

7

(3.8)

11.7

Clarence Thomas

26

(3.3)

2

(1.1)

12.3

4

(0.5)

4

(2.2)

12.3

791

(100.0)

185

(100.1)

Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Total

Even though Chief Justice Rehnquist disproportionately assigned
83
opinions to his allies, as seen in Table 2, bivariate analysis of
Rehnquist’s assignment practices does not support the basic premise
of the agenda-setting explanation. That is, the Chief Justice apparently did not assign opinions to shape the development of the law in
line with his preferences. A difference in means test, presented in
Table 3, demonstrates that Justices who received writing assignments
from the Chief were not significantly closer to the Chief ideologically
84
than those Justices who were passed over for the task. Perhaps, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist made efforts to set the agenda only in
85
politically salient cases. In fact, as seen in Table 3, the Chief did as-

83

Justice Stevens is the lone exception.
I measured ideological distance by taking the absolute difference between the
assignor’s ideology and the ideology of Justices in the conference majority, as measured by the percentage of a Justice’s votes that were liberal in an area of law. Data
were taken from Spaeth, supra note 43.
85
Politically salient cases are those cases that were reported on the front page of
The New York Times. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 66, 72-76 (2000) (proposing a New York Times measure of salience for Su84
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sign politically salient cases to Justices who were significantly closer to
him in ideology than others in the conference majority. I do not,
however, find a bivariate relationship supporting the strategic assign86
ment of close cases to Justices relatively distant from the Chief in or87
der to maintain the majority coalition.
Table 3: Difference in Means Tests for Explanations of
Rehnquist’s Opinion Assignments

Variable

Assigned
Opinion

Not Assigned
Opinion

Difference

Probability

Ideological Distance

2.11

2.00

-.11

.94

Ideological Distance in
Politically Salient Cases

1.66

1.87

.21

.12

Ideological Distance in
Minimum Winning Cases

1.83

1.46

-.37

.001

Assignment Cycle Equity

.16

.34

.18

.000

Annual Equity

.42

.43

.01

.71

Number of Late Majority
Opinion Drafts

.93

1.05

.12

.01

Number of Late Dissenting Opinion Drafts

.44

.44

.00

.58

1.74

1.92

.18

.01

Number of Late Votes

preme Court cases). Data were obtained from http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
salience.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
86
Close cases are those where the conference majority or plurality had five or
fewer Justices. I used Justice Blackmun’s docket sheets to determine which cases did
not exceed a minimum winning coalition at the conference vote.
87
Since Chief Justice Rehnquist occupied one of the more extreme ideological
positions on his Court, I would expect him to assign the opinion to a Justice more distant from himself (for example, the median).
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Table 4: Random Effects Model of Rehnquist’s Opinion
88
Assignment Decisions
Model 1
Variables

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Ideological Distance

Model 2
Coefficient
(Standard Error)

.059

.064

(.012)

(.014)

Politically Salient Case

.152 *
(.086)

Politically Salient Case * Ideological Distance

-.064 *
(.035)

Minimum Winning Conference Coalition

.158 *
(.077)

Minimum Winning Conference Coalition *
Ideological Distance
Assignment Cycle Equity

.086 **
(.033)
-.444 ***

-.443 ***

(.049)

(.049)

.012

.011

(.046)

(.046)

-.042 *

-.049 **

(.019)

(.020)

.007

-.007

(.019)

(.019)

-.011

-.009

Annual Equity

Number of Late Majority Opinion Drafts

Number of Late Dissenting Opinion Drafts

Number of Late Votes

(.011)
Constant

-1.011 ***
(.038)

Number of Observations
Wald Chi Squared

5437
95.97 ***

(.011)
-1.080 ***
(.043)
5437
137.10 ***

There is evidence from this bivariate analysis to support Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assertion that he assigned opinions to Justices current
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Please note the following:
* = p ≤ .05 (one-tailed test)
** = p ≤ .01 (one-tailed test)
*** = p ≤ .001 (one-tailed test)
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in their work and to maintain an equitable distribution of assignments
across the chambers. First, there are statistically significant associations between the Chief’s assignment decisions and a Justice’s number
of pending majority opinion drafts and votes that are past due, ac89
cording to Rehnquist. There is no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between overdue dissent drafts and assignment decisions. The support for equity is more complex. There is evidence
that Rehnquist was reluctant to assign opinions to Justices who had re90
ceived assignments from an Associate Justice. This reflects the tradeoffs that Chief Justices make during a single assignment cycle. In contrast, there is no evidence to support Rehnquist’s assertion that he was
attentive to the number of assignments a Justice received during the
91
Term as a whole.
These bivariate results shift somewhat when subjected to multi92
variate controls. As seen in Table 4, Rehnquist was apt to assign the
opinion, all else held constant, to a Justice who was ideologically distant from himself. This is consistent with the findings of other studies
93
of Rehnquist’s assignment decisions. There are two possible explanations for this pattern. First, Rehnquist may not have used his assignment powers routinely to maximize his policy gain. Instead, he
may have reserved his ideological allies for especially important cases.
As seen in Table 2, Rehnquist was significantly less likely to assign the
opinion to an ideologically distant Justice when the case was politically
salient. Interestingly, as also seen in Table 2, the pattern of favoring
his ideological opponents was accentuated in cases with a fragile conference majority.
89

The number of late, pending majority opinion drafts, dissenting opinion drafts,
and overdue votes were derived from the opinion logs maintained by Justice Blackmun’s chambers. These logs contain information on the dates when opinion drafts
were circulated, as well as when Justices sent memos joining an opinion, which is the
manner in which they cast their final vote.
90
I used the assignment sheets found in Justice Blackmun’s papers to calculate
the number of assignments each Justice received from an Associate Justice. The assignment sheet designates these cases by placing the initials of the Associate Justice assigning the opinion next to the case name.
91
Using information from the assignment sheets, I determined whether a Justice
needed additional assignments to reach the running mean of assignments given to the
Justices at that point in the Term.
92
I estimate a multivariate model using random-effects probit where there is an
observation for each Justice who is eligible to receive an assignment by virtue of voting
with the conference majority.
93
See, e.g., Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 7, at 426 (concluding that, under
certain conditions, Chief Justice Rehnquist was most likely to assign opinions to Justices ideologically distant from himself).
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A second explanation for Rehnquist’s equal treatment of ideological allies and other Justices is that the Rehnquist Court was more
consistently conservative than the Burger Court. The Court, during
much of the Rehnquist Court era, was dominated by conservative Justices, as evidenced by the shifting ideological median. In the Terms
examined here, 1986 to 1993, the median Justice was significantly
more conservative than the median during the Burger Court—or even
94
the median in the post-Blackmun Rehnquist Court. Thus, there was
little policy gain to be realized from assigning to the ideologically
closest Justices, as Rehnquist could be assured of a satisfactory opinion
from a number of different Justices.
The effect of the organizational needs articulated by Chief Justice
Rehnquist is not as powerful when subjected to multivariate controls.
The only significant workload factor, outlined in Rehnquist’s 1989
95
memo, was the number of late majority opinion drafts. It is apparent that Rehnquist did penalize Justices who had a number of delinquent majority opinion drafts (that is, more than four weeks had
elapsed since the Justice received the assignment). Incidentally, the
effect of these workload variables is not heightened as the Court approaches the end of its Term. In addition to this workload effect,
Rehnquist pursued the norm of equitable distribution of assignments
within each argument session.
CONCLUSION
As we look toward the tenure of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
we can extrapolate lessons for the use of opinion assignment in guiding the Court. First, the Chief Justice can use opinion assignment to
advance his policy goals. By assigning opinions to his ideological allies, the Chief Justice may realize policy gain in cases where he stands
with the majority or may minimize his policy loss when the majority
takes a position contrary to his. In the foreseeable future, though,
Chief Justice Roberts will enjoy leading a Court where the median is a
relatively conservative voice. This will enable him to distribute opin94

Using Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn’s measure of the Court median, a difference in means test reveals that the median grows significantly more conservative
from the 1986 Term to the 1993 Term. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 19531999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 134-51 (2002) (discussing the methods and datasets used
to achieve these results). Martin and Quinn’s data on Court ideology are available at
http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
95
Rehnquist memorandum, supra note 27.
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ion assignments across many Justices without any discernable policy
loss.
Nevertheless, the Chief will find himself, like Chief Justice
Rehnquist, constrained by the strategic context of each case, as well as
by the expectations of his colleagues. He may reserve his allies for assignments to particularly salient cases, while minimizing his policy loss
in cases with close conference votes by assigning those opinions to Justices at the center of the Court’s ideological spectrum. At the same
time that he strives to balance these ideological considerations, Chief
Justice Roberts may be attentive to the effect of opinion assignment
on the operation of the Court as an organization. Specifically, the
Chief Justice may, like his predecessor, equalize assignments throughout the year by giving each Justice roughly the same number of assignments each cycle. He may also use future assignments as an incentive to complete majority opinions previously assigned.
Regardless of how Chief Justice Roberts seeks to balance these
competing demands, he will come to appreciate the potential and pitfalls of opinion assignment for advancing his vision of good legal policy. Depending on how he chooses to deploy assignments among his
colleagues, he may also come to see the wisdom of Justice Douglas’s
warning that assignment tactics can lead to “a frayed and bitter Court
96
full of needless strains and quarrels.” In an office without many prerogatives of power, the ability to assign the task of writing opinions
gives the Chief Justice the capacity to shape the Court.

96

Douglas letter, supra note 6.

